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Modern trade agreements no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on 
international policy coordination in a much broader sense. In this paper we introduce the 
emerging literature on the political economy of such deep integration agreements. We organize 
our discussion around three main points. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements 
is moving beyond the classic antagonism of exporter interests who gain from trade and import-
competing interests who lose from trade. Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against 
deep integration agreements than there was against shallow integration agreements. And third, the 
welfare economics of trade agreements have become more complex, in the sense that the insight 
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The nature of trade agreements has changed fundamentally over the past decades, so much
so that the term itself has become somewhat misleading nowadays. Modern trade agreements
no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on international policy co-
ordination in a much broader sense. For example, they routinely deal with a wide range of
regulatory matters, offer special protections to foreign investors, strengthen intellectual prop-
erty rights, coordinate national competition policies, and constrain government procurement
activities. In trade economist lingo, trade agreements now pursue deep integration in the
sense of going far beyond the traditional shallow integration agenda of reducing import tariffs
and constraining related policies.
In this paper we focus on the politics and economics of deep integration. We purposely
invert the traditional sequence of “economics”and “politics”because we believe some of the
most interesting developments on deep integration, both in the real world and in academic
research, have been in the domain of special-interest and electoral politics. Thus we will first
focus on the political aspects of deep integration agreements, and then on the design of such
agreements from an effi ciency standpoint.
We argue that the political economy of trade policy has changed along three key di-
mensions. First, trade negotiations no longer align special interests in a way that naturally
pushes towards welfare-improving agreements: the old intuition that trade agreements neu-
tralize protectionist forces by pitting exporter interests against import-competing interests no
longer applies. For example, we now see international business alliances opposing international
activist groups on environmental regulation, or rich-country producers opposing poor-country
producers on intellectual property rights.
Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against deep integration agreements than
there was against shallow integration agreements. Deep agreements seem to face stronger po-
litical opposition because they encroach on sensitive regulatory issues and connect to broader
ideological controversies about the power of ‘big business’ and the importance of national
sovereignty. This new political activism started with the ‘Battle of Seattle’in 1999, a series of
intense protests against the WTO, which had just expanded its scope into the areas of regula-
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tion and intellectual property rights, and continued with a powerful backlash in the streets of
Europe against the deep agreements between the European Union and the United States (the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP) and between the European Union
and Canada (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA).
Third, the welfare economics of trade agreements have become more complex. The insight
that "free trade is good" is no longer suffi cient as a guide to evaluating the effi ciency of
international agreements. In a world of shallow agreements that focuses on tariff cooperation,
a good rule of thumb is that if an agreement leads to lower tariffs, it has done a good job.
But in a world where governments strive to cooperate on regulatory policies, for example,
the ultimate objective of an international agreement is more complex, since regulations are
typically imposed for more than just protectionist motives. As a result, economists (should)
have a harder time assessing the merits of modern trade agreements.
In this paper we offer our assessment of the emerging literature on the political economy of
deep integration, focusing particularly on the three developments outlined above.1 Our goal
is to take stock of what we have learned so far and point to fruitful areas for future research.
After decades of trade liberalization, shallow integration has largely run its course, so deep
integration is arguably the future of trade policy. This is an area characterized by complex
questions and intense controversies, which deserve the careful attention of trade economists.
Indeed, we believe that reservations against deep integration are an important driving force of
the broader ‘globalization backlash’seen today. And deep integration issues loom large even
in the ongoing trade war between China and the United States, which was fueled by American
frustrations over Chinese industrial policy and its (lack of) protection for intellectual property
rights.
There have been other important developments affecting the political economy of trade
policy that we do not cover in this paper. One such development is related to the disruptions
that Chinese import competition caused to local labor markets in the United States (Autor et
al, 2013) and their distributional consequences. We refer the reader to Rodrik’s (forthcoming)
chapter in this Review for an excellent overview of the implications of the China shock for
1This emphasis also differentiates our discussion of deep integration from an earlier review of the literature
on non-tariff barriers to trade by Ederington and Ruta (2016).
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the political economy of trade policy. Another such development is the changing geopolitical
landscape, with the hegemony of the United States being increasingly challenged by a rising
China. We refer the reader to Mattoo and Staiger (forthcoming) for an inspiring first take on
the relation between this trend and the outlook for international trade agreements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide some real-
world background on deep integration, describing how it has progressed in practice and which
controversies it has brought about. In section 3 we turn to our discussion of the ‘politics’
of deep integration, focusing first on the changing nature of special-interest politics in this
area, and then on the popular backlash against deep integration. In section 4 we offer a brief
discussion of the new ‘economics’of deep integration agreements, focusing on the design of
such agreements from a welfare point of view. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
2 Deep integration in practice
In this section we provide some background on deep integration, describing how it has pro-
gressed in practice and which controversies it has brought about. We organize our discussion
along two dimensions. First, we distinguish between the multilateral trading system as incor-
porated in the GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements including plurilateral initia-
tives. Second, we emphasize what we believe to be the most salient deep integration issues,
namely regulation, foreign investment, and intellectual property rights.
2.1 The multilateral trading system
During the GATT years from 1947 to 1994, the multilateral trading system was squarely
focused on shallow integration. The idea of the GATT was to induce countries to exchange
market access concessions by reducing import tariffs and to secure these market access con-
cessions by preventing countries from taking alternative protectionist measures. On the one
hand, this involved prohibitions of other trade policies such as quantitative restrictions (Arti-
cle XI) and export subsidies (Article XVI). On the other hand, this also implied constraints on
domestic policies by requiring “national treatment”(Article III) and allowing for non-violation
complaints (Article XXIII). National treatment simply means that imported products cannot
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be treated differently than domestic products with respect to domestic taxes and regulations.
Non-violation complaints are complaints about measures that "nullify or impair" previously
made commitments even though the measures as such do not violate the GATT. The GATT
approach was therefore shallow not in the sense of not interfering with behind the border
measures at all, but rather in the sense of interfering with behind the border measures only
to the extent that they were used as substitutes for border measures (we sometimes refer to
this as ‘policed shallow integration’below).
This changed with the inception of the WTO in 1995, which extended its reach into the
realm of domestic policies, such as regulation and intellectual property rights.2 As Mavroidis
(2016) explains, the WTO goes beyond the simple principle that regulatory policies be applied
in a non-discriminatory way to domestic and foreign firms (national treatment) and requires
that regulations meet a number of additional criteria. In particular, they must be transparent
and must not have unnecessary trade-restricting effects. Some also have to be based on
science, be internally consistent, and follow other ‘good regulatory practices’. The Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS) are the most relevant WTO agreements in this regard. One interesting feature
is that they include a presumption that regulatory measures do not present an unnecessary
barrier to trade if they are based on international standards, thus pushing countries toward
harmonization.3
The WTO also includes the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), which has no counterpart in the GATT. As Saggi (2016) reports, the TRIPS
agreement was pushed through by the United States, the European Union, and Japan against
strong opposition from Brazil, India, and China. The proponents were dissatisfied with the
state of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the global economy, particularly the
widespread imitation and piracy occurring in major developing countries. The TRIPS agree-
ment covers a wide range of IPR policies including patents, copyrights, industrial designs, and
2The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures are other important WTO agreement that have deep integration elements. Staiger and Sykes (2019)
and Bagwell and Staiger (2006) analyze these agreements and we will come back to these papers below.
3An interesting fact about standards is that many of them are actually voluntary. See Schmidt and Steingress
(2020) for a novel database on such voluntary standards and an estimation of their impact on international
trade.
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trademarks. As in the case of regulatory policies, TRIPS not only requires that IPR protection
be offered in a non-discriminatory way (thus imposing the most-favored-nation and national-
treatment rules), but goes further, for example requiring countries to offer patent protection
for foreign inventions for at least 20 years, thus bringing about a substantial strengthening
of IPR protection in most developing countries. India, for example, did not grant product
patents at all prior to TRIPS in some important sectors such as pharmaceuticals.
These deep integration elements have provoked much controversy inside and outside the
WTO. Inside the WTO, the TRIPS agreement has been particularly contentious since it
essentially implies that developing countries have to adopt the IPR systems of developed
countries. A common concern is that stronger IPRs benefit developed countries at the expense
of developing countries, and possibly at the expense of effi ciency, by allowing firms from
developed countries to charge higher prices and preventing firms from developing countries
from catching up. Some observers even see TRIPS as a key reason for the current stalemate
at the WTO.4
Outside the WTO negotiation rooms, the above-mentioned Battle of Seattle was the kick-
off event of a new kind of anti-globalization movement. The Atlantic recalls that “[t]he
organizers were a hodgepodge of groups —unions worried about competition from cheap for-
eign labor, environmentalists worried about the outsourcing of polluting activities, consumer
protection groups worried about unsafe imports, labor rights groups worried about bad work-
ing conditions in other countries, and leftists of various stripes simply venting their anger at
capitalism.”5 The overarching theme of the protests was that the WTO’s expanded mandate
would allow it to encroach on democratic decision-making in pursuit of a pro-business agenda.
4The Economist, for example, noted in a commentary on the failure of the Doha Round over a seemingly
minor issue that “the shadow of the Uruguay Round arguably extended beyond this nettlesome detail. Many
developing countries believe that the earlier round was lopsided, doing little to constrain the farm policies of
the rich world even as it placed heavy obligations on the poor in areas such as intellectual property. In the
Doha Round they wanted to get their own back, by asking more of the rich world than they offered in return”
(www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2008/07/31/the-doha-roundand-roundand-round).




2.2 Preferential trade agreements
While the WTO has taken some significant steps towards deep integration, the main push
has happened in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). This can be seen clearly in a recently
compiled database on the content of PTAs, which Hofmann et al (2017) constructed for
the World Bank. The database covers 279 PTAs among 189 countries and distinguishes
between 52 policy areas. Some of these policy areas are border measures (tariffs, export
taxes, antidumping, etc.), but the majority are behind-the-border measures (including the
ones we focus on in this paper, namely regulatory policies, IPR protection, and investment
policies).
Hofmann et al (2017) highlight some interesting patterns. They show that the average
number of provisions contained in PTAs has increased steadily starting from 1990, going
from an average of 11 provisions for PTAs signed between 1990 and 1994 to 23 provisions
for PTAs signed between 2010 and 2015 (pp. 14-15).6 Even though some of the policy areas
included in the PTAs are border measures, which are not in the domain of deep integration
as defined in our paper, there is an unmistakable increasing trend in the number of domestic
policies that are covered in PTAs. Another indication of the deepening of PTAs is that,
at the end of the sample period, a large share of the active PTAs covered the deep policy
areas that we focus on in this paper (regulations, IPRs, investment policies) through legally
enforceable provisions. For example, 152 of the 279 PTAs that were in force in 2015 included
legally enforceable provisions on technical barriers to trade, and the respective number for
sanitary and phytosanitary standards was 147. Finally, an interesting fact is that North-North
agreements are the ones with the highest average number of legally enforceable provisions
(almost 20), followed by North-South agreements (less than 15), and South-South agreements
(about 9).7
At the same time, it must be noted that some of the most important deep PTAs have
failed. The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the
6 In part, the observed increase in the average number of provisions in PTAs also reflects a bundling of
existing initiatives. A good example is investor protection, which was typically dealt with using bilateral
investment treaties but is now increasingly included in PTAs.
7Mattoo et al (2020) present a complementary dataset that focuses more on the “vertical depth” (or “in-
tensive margin”) of preferential trade agreements. Their findings are broadly consistent with the stylized facts
from Hoffman at al (2017) that we have outlined in the text.
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European Union and the United States has been put on ice over fierce opposition from both
sides of the Atlantic. The United States also withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP) among Pacific Rim countries, which eventually was reconstituted by the remaining
countries in a somewhat watered-down form. And even the Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada was almost sabotaged
at the very last minute, when the Belgian province of Wallonia opposed ratification of the
agreement. These three agreements are often viewed as the archetypes of modern trade
agreements so it is important to note the fierce opposition they provoked.
Efforts in the areas of investment and regulation are probably the most contentious ele-
ments of modern PTAs. Building on bilateral investment treaties, the investment provisions of
modern PTAs typically pursue two objectives. First, they aim to promote foreign investment,
for example by removing foreign equity caps or performance requirements, and by opening
markets such as financial services or telecommunications to "mode 3" services trade.8 Sec-
ond, they aim to protect foreign investors from expropriation, including indirect expropriation
through regulatory takings. What is particularly controversial is that foreign investors are
usually given access to an investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS), which allows them
to directly sue foreign governments for money damages in arbitration tribunals outside the
ordinary legal system.
The provisions on regulatory cooperation also tend to pursue two goals. The first goal
is to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’on issues such as worker or environmental protection.
The second goal is to reduce regulatory trade barriers, by promoting ‘good regulatory prac-
tices’similar to the WTO’s TBT and SPS agreements and by reducing excessive regulatory
heterogeneity.9
Political activism against deep PTAs has been particularly prevalent in Europe. For
8For example, CETA chapter 8 "sets out measures to open up investment between the EU and Canada",
CETA chapter 13 "enables financial institutions and investors in the EU and Canada to benefit from fair, equal
access to each other’s markets", and CETA chapter 15 gives "each other’s businesses fair and equal access to
public telecommunications networks and services".
9As examples of the first goal, CETA chapter 23 "prevents either side from ignoring or lowering labour
standards to boost trade", while chapter 24 "prevents either side from relaxing their [environmental] laws to
boost trade". And as examples of the second goal, CETA’s chapter 5 "ensures that measures by either side
to ensure food safety and animal and plant health do not create unjustified barriers to trade [...]", chapter
12 "ensure[s] that domestic regulations in the other territory don’t act as an unfair barrier to trade", and
chapter 21 "encourages regulators to exchange experiences and information, and identify areas where they
could cooperate".
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example, an estimated 250,000 people took to the streets in Berlin in 2015 to oppose the
proposed TTIP and CETA deals, as part of a wave of continent-wide protests. While some
of the opponents criticized every form of economic globalization, the vast majority objected
specifically to the deep integration provisions on regulation and investment. As The Guardian
reported, they feared that the agreements would "water down important EU regulations" and
"give too much power to multinational companies at the expense of consumers and workers".10
But deep PTAs are also controversial on the other side of the Atlantic, especially regarding
the ISDS issue. In a recent editorial, US Senator Elizabeth Warren succinctly summarizes
the ISDS controversy: "Conservatives who believe in US sovereignty should be outraged
that ISDS would shift power from American courts, whose authority is derived from our
Constitution, to unaccountable international tribunals. Libertarians should be offended that
ISDS effectively would offer a free taxpayer subsidy to countries with weak legal systems. And
progressives should oppose ISDS because it would allow big multinationals to weaken labor
and environmental rules."11
In sum, deep integration has gained momentum since the 1990s when the WTO was
created and PTAs expanded in number and scope. But despite this momentum, the path to
deep integration has proven hard to travel, as evidenced by the slow progress of multilateral
and preferential initiatives. The WTO has not achieved much in this direction since its
foundation, and the most ambitious regional deep integration efforts have all experienced
major setbacks or failed. At the same time, deep integration is likely to remain the future of
trade cooperation, given that shallow integration has been all but completed.
3 The politics of deep integration
In this section we discuss the political economy of deep integration, and in particular the
change in the nature of special interest politics and the popular backlash against deep inte-
gration.
10The referenced article appeared in The Guardian on October 10, 2015 and can be accessed using the
following link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/berlin-anti-ttip-trade-deal-rally-hundreds-
thousands-protesters.
11Her editorial appeared in the Washington Post on February 25, 2015.
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3.1 Special interest politics
In this section we discuss our own work on the changing nature of special interest politics
(Maggi and Ossa, 2020) and relate it to the political science literature on this topic, and in
particular to the work by Young (2016, 2017).
A central point of our theory in Maggi and Ossa (2020) is that the lobbying forces that
shape deep integration agreements are more complex and less benign than those that shape
shallow integration agreements. In particular, while the negotiation of shallow trade agree-
ments pits import-competing interests against exporting interests, which tends to enhance
effi ciency, the coalitions of special interests that emerge around the negotiation of deep agree-
ments do not necessarily push towards an effi ciency-enhancing outcome.
We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the welfare impacts of shallow and deep
agreements when such agreements are negotiated under pressure from producer lobbies, build-
ing on the canonical model by Grossman and Helpman (1995). We depart from the canonical
model in three main ways. First, we go beyond the analysis of shallow integration and focus
on international regulatory cooperation, which is a particularly salient issue area for deep
integration. Second, in order to examine how politically-motivated agreements affect global
welfare, we distinguish between the governments’ “positive” objectives and a “normative”
criterion. Most existing models adopt the same government objective function to predict and
evaluate trade policy choices, thus they cannot address the widespread concern that trade
agreements benefit special interests at the expense of society.12 And third, we consider a
world with many small countries, rather than the canonical large-country setting. This allows
us to put lobbying at the heart of trade negotiations, as small countries have no ability to
manipulate terms of trade.13
With respect to shallow integration, our model confirms the common intuition that trade
negotiations tend to enhance global welfare, because they trigger opposition between import-
competing interests and export-oriented interests, thereby bringing about beneficial reductions
12Notable exceptions are Grossman and Helpman (1995b) and Ornelas (2005, 2008), who discuss whether
politically-viable regional trade agreements are likely to cause more trade diversion or creation, and thus
whether they are likely to increase or reduce welfare. But these papers do not examine deep integration.
13The feature that lobbying is key to the purpose of a trade agreement is present also in some domestic-
commitment models of trade agreements, e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Mitra (2002). But these
papers make very different points from the present paper, and they do not address deep agreements.
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in trade barriers. Without trade negotiations, import-competing interests remain unchal-
lenged because there is little governments can do to increase their exporters’foreign market
access. But this changes with trade negotiations, since exporting interests can then find a
voice by lobbying for reciprocal tariff cuts.14
Rodrik (2018) was among the first scholars to suggest that this logic of ‘countervailing
lobbying’between import-competing and exporting interests may no longer work in modern
deep integration agreements. He argues informally that "[r]ather than reining in protection-
ists, trade agreements empower another set of special interests and politically well-connected
firms, such as international banks, pharmaceutical companies, and multinational corporations.
Such agreements may result in freer, mutually beneficial trade, through exchange of market
access. But they are as likely to produce welfare-reducing, or purely redistributive outcomes
under the guise of free trade" (pp. 75-76).
In Maggi and Ossa (2020) we scrutinize Rodrik’s intuition through a formal model of
regulatory cooperation. We argue that it is important to distinguish between two areas of
regulatory cooperation: product standards, defined as restrictions on the characteristics of
products sold in a given country, and process standards, defined as restrictions on the pro-
duction processes that take place on a country’s soil. Examples of product standards include
emissions standards for automobiles and safety standards for children’s toys. As mentioned
earlier, some of the most famous controversies regarding deep integration have involved prod-
uct standards. Examples of process standards include environmental regulations for factories
and safety standards for workers. As we emphasized above, many modern trade agreements
include provisions on process standards, often with the stated motivation of preventing a
harmful ‘race to the bottom’. And as we explain below, international cooperation on product
standards and on process standards can have dramatically different welfare implications.
Standards can be used for legitimate welfare purposes, and in particular to address con-
sumption and production externalities. For example, product standards might cap the pollu-
tion emissions from automobiles sold in the local market, and process standards might cap the
14 It is important to note that this point holds only if export subsidies are not freely available, otherwise
governments would use export subsidies to directly cater to export-oriented interests without the need of trade
negotiations. In practice, the GATT has long prohibited export subsidies, so we take this restriction as a fact
of life.
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pollution emissions from factories operating on the national territory. A government’s choice
of standards balances producer surplus, consumer surplus and externality considerations.
Following the canonical Grossman-Helpman approach to lobbying, we emphasize the role
of producer lobbies, in line with the idea that it is easier for producers to overcome collective-
action problems and get politically organized. We capture the influence of producer lobbies
in a reduced-form fashion, by assuming that governments attach an extra weight to producer
groups in the various industries. The influence of producer lobbies tends to distort the reg-
ulatory choices of governments in the non-cooperative scenario, and the question is whether
regulatory cooperation dilutes the distortionary influence of lobbies, or rather intensifies it.
This in turn depends crucially on whether the interests of lobbies in different countries are
aligned (a situation that we refer to as “co-lobbying”), or in conflict (a situation of “counter-
vailing lobbying”).
In the case of product standards, we find that co-lobbying prevails, so an international
agreement strengthens the overall influence of special interests on regulatory policy. The
reason is that producers in all countries benefit from de-regulation, since looser product stan-
dards imply lower local consumer prices, thereby boosting demand and raising the world-wide
producer price. This in turn implies that a deep agreement on product standards can reduce
global welfare, and this is more likely to happen if lobbies are more powerful.
In the case of process standards, however, lobbying pressures have a much more benign
effect. In this case, we find that international cooperation increases welfare if lobbies are
suffi ciently powerful. This is because international negotiations induce countervailing lobbying
between domestic and foreign producers, and hence dilute the overall influence of special
interests on regulatory policy. Specifically, domestic producers now prefer weaker domestic
standards but stricter foreign standards, so that domestic costs are lower and foreign costs are
higher. In this setting, if lobbies are very powerful then non-cooperative process standards are
too loose —a “race to the bottom”situation —and regulatory cooperation leads to a tightening
of process standards, thus mitigating the welfare distortion.
Our model focuses on non-discriminatory standards, since imposing discriminatory regu-
lations creates barriers to trade, and thus prohibiting discrimination can be viewed as part of
shallow integration. Indeed, recall that the GATT’s "national treatment" principle requires
12
that domestic policies be set in a non-discriminatory way. In practice, tackling discrimination
in regulatory policies is an unfinished job, not only in the GATT/WTO but also in recent
PTAs. Our analysis of shallow integration summarized above suggests that, to the extent that
the issue of discriminatory standards is on the international negotiating table, the influence of
lobbies on the agreement should tend to be benign, because there should be counter-lobbying
between import-competing producers and exporters.
One important takeaway of the Maggi-Ossa model is that the role of special interest
politics in deep integration agreements is more complex and potentially less benign than its
counterpart in shallow integration agreements. It goes beyond the classic antagonism between
import-competing and export-oriented interests, and can push trade agreements in a welfare-
improving or a welfare-reducing direction, depending on whether the interests of producer
lobbies within a given industry but across international borders are aligned or in conflict.
This argument has an interesting point of contact with the recent political science literature
on deep integration. For example, Young (2016, 2017) documents that, in the context of TTIP
negotiations, the global cleavages in special interest groups were very different from those that
are typical of shallow integration agreements. His main point is that the classic opposition
between import-competing and export-oriented interests has played almost no role in TTIP
negotiations. Instead, American and European business groups largely acted in a coordinated
way, both in supporting TTIP negotiations and in influencing the content of TTIP. He argues
that these transatlantic business alliances were a new phenomenon in the history of trade
negotiations, and attributes this to the fact that TTIP negotiations were significantly deeper
than any previous trade negotiations, particularly with respect to regulatory cooperation.
Young (2016) reports that "[l]eading American and European manufacturing and services
associations from a diverse array of sectors - including automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuti-
cals, financial services, and insurance - have submitted joint proposals for easing regulatory
barriers and lowering tariffs" (page 348). Analyzing submissions to the consultations of the
United States Trade Representative, among other things, he concludes that "there [was] an
almost complete absence of business opposition to the negotiations" (page 350). According
to Young, conflict across business groups was observed only in the agricultural sector, were
no transatlantic alliances were formed.
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It is important to note that the transatlantic business alliances documented by Young and
the fact that they strongly supported TTIP negotiations should not necessarily be interpreted
as evidence of harmful co-lobbying. The presence of these alliances is consistent with both
mechanisms highlighted by the Maggi-Ossa model, namely that international business inter-
ests should push for a tightening of process standards and a loosening of product standards
relative to their noncooperative levels. In either case, the model suggests that if lobbies are
suffi ciently powerful they should support the agreement, because a key role of the agreement
is then to internalize the negative externalities exerted by a country’s tightening of product
standards and a weakening of process standards on foreign producers. In our model, harmful
co-lobbying occurs when there is joint lobbying for looser standards, not when there is joint
lobbying as such.
The Maggi-Ossa political economy approach to trade negotiations delivers some provoca-
tive messages. It portrays the welfare gains achieved during decades of GATT negotiations
as a lucky byproduct of an essentially political agenda, and it suggests that deep integration
may be good or bad for welfare depending on whether it intensifies or dilutes the influence
of special interests on trade policy. But it leaves open a number of theoretical and empirical
questions. At the theoretical level, it would be important to examine the welfare impacts of
international cooperation in other salient areas of deep integration, such as foreign investment
and IPR policies. The cleavages between special interests across country borders are clearly
issue-area specific, but our conjecture is that the basic logic outlined above will continue to
apply, namely that trade negotiations tend to enhance welfare if they dilute the overall influ-
ence of lobbies on policy-making, while tend to reduce welfare if they intensify such influence,
at least if lobbies are suffi ciently powerful.
With respect to empirical work, we see two important and connected questions. The first
one is just how beneficial or harmful real-world trade agreements are for welfare, that is,
how the counteracting forces highlighted in the Maggi-Ossa model play out quantitatively.
The second question is just how good or bad lobbying is for welfare, that is, how the welfare
implications of real-world trade agreements would change in response to shifts in the polit-
ical influence of lobbies. And while the basic Maggi-Ossa model focuses on a setting with
symmetric countries, an empirical implementation of the model would need to consider coun-
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try asymmetries, and therefore examine welfare impacts on individual countries in addition to
global welfare. These questions would be best addressed in the context of a quantitative model
of regulatory cooperation, but such work has to confront the challenge of modeling regulatory
policies in a reasonably realistic yet tractable way. One idea would be to follow Goldberg
and Pavcnik’s (2016) advice of taking an industrial-organization approach to the problem and
focus on specific industries. A recent example of this approach is the work of Miravete et
al (2018), who demonstrate how EU fuel taxation and emissions policies systematically favor
diesel-powered vehicles which are made predominantly by EU car manufacturers.
3.2 Popular backlash
In the previous section we focused on how cleavages in special interest groups are changing in
response to the shift towards deep agreements. Here we focus on another important change
in the political economy environment, namely the backlash against deep integration from
consumer groups, environmental groups, and in some cases voters at large.15
The popular backlash against deep integration has been more intense in Europe, but it
has occurred to some extent also in the United States. In Europe, the TTIP and CETA
negotiations triggered large street protests. As Young (2016) reports, in Europe more than 3
million people signed an online campaign against TTIP, and 90 EU-based NGOs signed a letter
to the European Commissioner for Trade expressing concern about proposals for regulatory
cooperation, arguing that they “could easily facilitate a roll-back of protection provided by
existing legislation” (p. 351). In the United States, the main episode of street protests
occurred in Seattle in 1999 against the WTO, but there was significant civic opposition also
against TTIP: for example, 73 US-based NGOs signed a letter to the United States Trade
Representative which paralleled the one sent by the EU-based NGOs. And on both sides of
the ocean, civic interest groups also voiced opposition to the investor-state dispute settlement
provisions in the TTIP.16
15Our discussion in this section will focus only on developed countries, both because the popular backlash
against globalization has been observed mostly in these countries, and because there is a paucity of empirical
and theoretical research on voters’attitudes toward globalization in developing countries.
16 It is interesting to note that in the United States there was some mobilization also against the TPP,
but only by labor unions, and specifically the AFL-CIO, which was worried mostly about labor standards in
low-wage countries.
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One might wonder whether the popular backlash against deep integration is simply part
of a broader reaction against globalization and trade. The answer is not obvious, but it leans
towards no. Opinion polls from the United States suggest that the overall share of voters
who support free trade has not diminished in the last 10-15 years, and if anything it has gone
up: see for example www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm.17 Also in Europe, we are not aware of
evidence that popular support for shallow integration has decreased, even in the UK, where
a majority of citizens voted to roll back on economic integration with the rest of Europe: in
fact, the Leave campaign was in favor of free trade and pushed Brexit as a way to achieve
freer trade with the rest of the world.
At a minimum, it is safe to say that the popular opposition to deep integration has not
been matched by a comparable opposition to shallow integration. This raises a question:
why? We can think of two classes of reasons why citizens may feel more strongly about deep
integration than they do about shallow integration:
Economic-utilitarian motives. One possibility is that the well-being of citizens is affected
more by regulations, IPRs and investment policies than by trade barriers. Coupled with a
belief that industrial lobbies have a disproportionate influence on deep agreements, this could
explain a popular backlash against deep integration.
“Ideological” (or “cultural”) backlash. Another possibility is that the popular reaction
against deep integration originates in psycho-sociological motivations, such as those that relate
to group identity. One can distinguish between two different versions of this mechanism.
The first one is a “left wing” reaction against the capitalist elite, and in particular against
multinational corporations. The second one is a “right wing”nationalist backlash leading to
a blanket rejection of supranational authorities.
In practice, the boundary between economic and cultural motives is not sharp: for exam-
ple, there may be a short distance between believing that immigration will hurt my economic
well-being and being culturally averse to immigrants. But in spite of this, the distinction
seems conceptually useful: we think of the first case as falling into the domain of economic
rationality (defined broadly to allow for incomplete information and arbitrary prior beliefs),
17 It is important to note that these opinion polls do not contradict the empirical findings, for example by
Autor et al. (2019), that the China trade shock caused a local anti-globalization backlash in the areas that
were hit by the shocks. More on these findings below.
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while the second falls at least in part outside of this domain.
3.2.1 Is it about economics?
A good example of the economic-utilitarian story is provided by Young (2016, 2017), who
focuses on the political-economy forces surrounding the TTIP negotiations. Young explains
the opposition to TTIP by civic interest groups (environmental groups, consumer groups and,
in Europe, citizens more broadly) based on the notion that people are more concerned about
safety and environmental standards than about tariffs. He argues that in the case of the TTIP
the perceived stakes for citizen groups were suffi ciently large that they exceeded the costs of
mobilization, whereas for the case of shallow integration the stakes may not have been large
enough to trigger mobilization. A similar argument is made by other scholars such as Evans
(2003) and Dur and Mateo (2014).
According to Young, the observed differences across the European Union and the United
States when it comes to TTIP are consistent with this stakes-based explanation. He notes
that civic engagement was significantly stronger in Europe than in the United States, and
argues that the perceived stakes were higher for EU civic groups because the European Union
had stricter regulations than the United States. From the point of view of US civic groups,
there was an upside and a downside to the future of regulations under a TTIP agreement.
The upside was that, to the extent that TTIP would lead to regulatory convergence with the
European Union, this would create pressure toward more stringent regulations in the United
States. The downside was the possibility of pressure toward de-regulation on both sides of the
Atlantic, for reasons like the ones we discussed in the previous section. From the point of view
of EU civic groups, on the other hand, there was no upside whatsoever to the TTIP, since
they were worried not only about big business lobbying for de-regulation across the Atlantic,
but also about regulatory harmonization in itself, since ‘meeting in the middle’would mean
less stringent regulations in the European Union.
Young also argues that, in the area of foreign investment, the perceived stakes associated
with the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) component of TTIP negotiations were higher
in the European Union than in the United States. From the point of view of civic interest
groups, the main concern about ISDS was the possibility that multinational corporations
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could exert excessive influence over host governments through a manipulable court system.
This concern is also related in important ways to the above-mentioned concerns about safety
and environmental regulations, since an ISDS system allows a corporation to sue a government
for imposing excessive regulatory burdens, so the ISDS issue was relevant not only for broad
consumer groups but also for environmental groups. Given the perceived power and influence
of US-owned multinational firms, it is plausible that European civic groups were genuinely
more concerned about the ISDS issue than were US civic groups. Moreover, in the years
running up to the anti-TTIP protests, a large share of known ISDS complaints had been
brought against European member states, while comparably fewer cases had been brought
against the United States, with the US government winning all of the cases.
3.2.2 Is it about ideology?
Can the popular backlash against deep integration be explained entirely on the basis of eco-
nomic rationality? While the story outlined above has intuitive appeal and is probably an
important part of the explanation, especially as it relates to regulatory cooperation, it is
unlikely to be the whole story.
For example, consider the Brexit movement. As mentioned above, this was a movement
against deep integration with the European Union, not against shallow integration. Recent
empirical studies suggest that it is hard to explain this phenomenon based on economic-
utilitarian considerations alone. For example, Colantone and Stanig (2018) find that local
China-related trade shocks were a key factor driving the vote for Brexit, in spite of the fact
that the Leave campaign was in favor of free trade.18 Furthermore, local immigration shocks
were not correlated with the Brexit vote, while separate survey data shows that perceptions
about immigration were correlated with the Brexit vote. These findings suggest that ideo-
logical/cultural factors play an important role in explaining the popular opposition to deep
integration.19
18That trade shocks can be a powerful trigger for nationalistic/conservative sentiments is suggested also
by a number of other studies: Autor et al. (2020), Cerrato et al. (2018), Ballard-Rosa et al (2017) and
Steiner and Harms (2020) find that the China trade shock caused a rise in nationalist attitudes, support for
conservative/authoritarian values, anti-immigrant sentiments and support for the GOP. Choi et al. (2020) find
similar results for the impact of the NAFTA shock in the US in the 1990s.
19The "cultural" explanation for the Leave vote is supported also by Margalit (2019), who finds that the
Leave vote was strongly correlated with support for cultural values such as social "closedness."
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In his recent piece in this Review, Rodrik (forthcoming) offers a thought-provoking discus-
sion of the relation between the anti-globalization backlash and the rise in populism in recent
years. He notes that the populism that has taken hold in Europe and in the US has been pre-
dominantly of the cultural-nationalist (right wing) brand, even though the anti-economic-elite
(left wing) brand of populism was perhaps better positioned to take advantage of the eco-
nomic shocks that have affected these regions. Rodrik’s broad view is that the various types
of globalization shocks —in particular trade, immigration and international finance shocks —
have deepened the divide between nationals and foreigners (“us” versus “them”) by creat-
ing easy out-group targets, such as foreign exporters, immigrants and international banks.20
Furthermore, an important role has been played by the interaction between the demand and
supply sides of politics: populist politicians have strategically played up the economic anx-
ieties of voters and the latent cultural cleavages by depicting the “others”as threats to the
voters’economic well-being and cultural values. This is a very plausible idea, we believe, but
it is not clear whether it can explain why the ideological backlash against deep integration has
been much stronger than that against shallow integration.21 We will return to this question
below.
In the formal literature there is a small but growing number of models that aim to explain
the backlash against globalization through mechanisms related to social group identification.
We discuss three of these papers in turn.
Mukand and Rodrik (2018) propose a model that emphasizes both the “demand” side
and the “supply” side of politics in triggering a rise of populism. A key ingredient of the
model on the supply side is that a political candidate can invest either in changing voters’
beliefs about their economic interests (what they call “worldview politics”) or in changing
20This view is consistent with empirical survey studies such as Mayda and Rodrik (2005), who find that
voters’trade preferences are strongly correlated with nationalism and attachment to local communities.
21Rodrik (2018) makes a point that relates to this question. He suggests one possible reason why populism
in Europe has not been characterized by anti-trade positions (for example this was very clear in the Brexit
campaign, as we noted above), in sharp contrast with the US: Europe has better compensation mechanisms
and safety nets in place, so that the gains from trade are better redistributed. In contrast, immigration shocks
can cause severe distributional problems even in Europe, because they can increase the fiscal burden on natives.
Note that this is a purely economic explanation: the idea is that European voters are not as concerned about
trade because they expect to be compensated in case of an adverse trade shock. But while this is likely to be
one of the forces at play, it cannot be the whole story. For one thing, this argument does not seem consistent
with the above-mentioned finding by Colantone and Stanig (2018) that in the context of Brexit the Leave vote
was explained by local trade shocks and not by local immigration shocks.
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their cultural identities (“identity politics”). One of their insights is that a globalization
shock that generates an increase in income inequality can induce politicians to shift toward
cultural-identity strategies, which can in turn lead to a deepening of socio-cultural divides.
Furthermore, because of the interaction between identity politics and worldview politics, this
can also lead to a change of voters’beliefs regarding the policies that are in their best economic
interests.
Grossman and Helpman (forthcoming) develop a model of identity politics where (even
small) shocks that increase income inequality can have dramatic effects on social identification
patterns and a shift toward anti-trade policies. In their model, low-income citizens can choose
to identify with their own income group, or with the nation as a whole, which includes high-
income citizens: the latter choice has a “status”benefit (belonging to a group that is richer on
average) and a “cognitive dissonance”cost (feeling a divergence with respect to the average
member of the group). If an economic shock, such as a rise of imports from China, increases
the income gap between the groups, it becomes harder for a low-income individual to identify
with the broad nation, because of a larger cognitive-dissonance cost. And if low-income
voters stop identifying with the nation as a whole, this may cause a shift toward protectionist
policies. Furthermore, if there is also a non-economic dimension to social identification, such
as an ethnic-racial cleavage, then an increase in the salience of such cleavage can trigger a
cultural segmentation of society and a rise in protectionism.
Endogenous group identities are also key in Gennaioli and Tabellini (2020), but their
model emphasizes the role of belief distortions and stereotypes in generating cultural con-
flicts and changes in equilibrium policies. In the trade policy application of their model,
they consider three underlying group cleavages: two are economic, namely low-income versus
high-income citizens and losers from trade versus winners from trade (import-oriented versus
export-oriented industries/regions), and one is cultural, say nationalists versus cosmopolitans
(or social conservatives versus progressives). Motivated by survey evidence, they assume a
positive correlation between trade exposure and conservative/nationalist inclinations.22 The
second key assumption is that a voter identifies with the group of people that she perceives
22As noted by Gennaioli and Tabellini, some scholars have explained this correlation based on a psychological
predisposition toward "closedness," and others have attributed it to a belief in "communal values."
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as closest to her and is in starkest contrast with the out-group. The third main ingredient of
the model is that voters’beliefs are distorted by group identities, through group stereotypes
that exaggerate the distinctive features of a group. In this setting, Gennaioli and Tabellini
show that certain shocks, such as an increase in import from China or a rise of immigration,
can exacerbate cultural divides such as the one between nationalists and cosmopolitans, as
well as the cleavage between winners and losers from trade, while the traditional economic
cleavage between rich and poor becomes less salient.
The above models can help explain a popular backlash against globalization, as well as a
concurrent rise in socio-cultural tensions within a society, but two subtle questions remain.
First, while these models can explain changes in the intensity of cleavages within a society,
they do not quite speak to the hostility between groups within that society and external
groups, or put simply, between nationals and foreigners, so they do not quite capture the
above-mentioned idea articulated by Rodrik (forthcoming). For example, in Grossman and
Helpman (forthcoming) the non-economic cleavages are those between racial-ethnic groups,
not between nationals and foreigners. And in Gennaioli and Tabellini (2020) one interpretation
of the cultural cleavage is in terms of nationalists versus cosmopolitans, which is related but
distinct from the cleavage between a country’s citizens and the country’s outsiders. One
reason why the role of the insider/outsider cleavage in identity politics is far from obvious is
simply that outsiders do not vote, so there is no obvious electoral benefit to a politician from
exacerbating the nationals/foreigners divide.
The second question is, even if one can argue that the political game in Europe and the
United States has deepened the divide between nationals and foreigners, can this explain the
differential backlash against deep integration versus shallow integration that we highlighted
above? This is not entirely clear. Consider for example a country that imports homogenous
goods or raw commodities: if the citizens of this country become culturally hostile to for-
eigners, they may be more reluctant to let other countries dictate their own domestic policy
choices, but they may still want to buy goods from them. When viewed from this perspective,
one can argue that a nationalistic backlash can lead to stronger opposition to deep integration
relative to shallow integration. But now suppose the same country imports goods for which
quality and safety are important and are not easily observable to the average citizen. Then
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a deepening of the cultural divide between nationals and foreigners —especially if it involves
diminished trust in foreigners —may affect beliefs about the quality/safety of imported prod-
ucts, and thus may reduce popular support for shallow and deep integration alike. This seems
like an open question worthy of further theoretical and empirical research.
4 The economics of deep integration
In this section we offer our perspective on the literature that focuses on the effi ciency properties
of deep trade agreements. A key difference with respect to the Maggi-Ossa approach discussed
in the previous section is that this literature evaluates effi ciency through the lens of the
governments’ objectives, making no distinction between governments’political motivations
and normative criterions. We loosely organize our discussion by issue area, considering the
regulatory, investment, and IPR dimensions of deep trade agreements in turn.
We begin our discussion with the work of Bagwell and Staiger (2001), which provides a
useful benchmark in this literature. They ask whether the WTO should include deep pro-
visions on environmental and labor standards in response to concerns that trade integration
could induce a harmful race to the bottom. They address this question in the context of a
standard neoclassical trade model in which countries can impose import tariffs and standards.
Standards are modeled in a reduced-form fashion as shift parameters of the import demand
and export supply functions in a deterministic environment. While countries have direct pref-
erences over domestic standards, they only care about the trade effects of foreign standards,
in keeping with the race-to-the-bottom focus of their analysis.
Their main result is that tariff negotiations lead to an effi cient outcome if countries are
prevented from subsequently undoing their market-access concessions by adjusting their stan-
dards. The key intuition is that countries do not care about the foreign policy mix per se
but only the market access it gives them. And countries only use standards to manipulate
the market access of foreign producers if they are constrained in their tariff choices, since
tariffs are a preferred instrument for this purpose. This result is a forceful endorsement of
an approach of ‘policed’shallow integration, in the sense of tariff commitments coupled with
market-access-preservation rules (such as national treatment and non-violation rules) —which
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the authors argue was the core of GATT’s approach.
A number of follow-up papers have pushed this message further, by arguing that some
real-world attempts towards deep integration are not only unnecessary but even harmful
for reaching effi ciency. One example is Bagwell and Staiger (2006) who analyze the WTO’s
stricter disciplines on domestic subsidies. They argue that the WTO has constrained domestic
subsidies so much that some effi cient policy mixes can no longer be attained through trade
negotiations. Another example is Staiger and Sykes (2019) who consider the WTO’s approach
to service trade liberalization under GATS. They argue that the GATS problems are rooted
in its focus on behind-the-border measures and suggest that countries should instead engage
in shallow negotiations over discriminatory taxes imposed against foreign service providers.
However, it has become clear that Bagwell and Staiger’s (2001) argument does not extend
to a number of alternative trade environments. First, as pointed out by Maggi (2014), even
in a standard competitive setting where trade agreements are motivated by terms-of-trade
externalities, a shallow integration approach may not work well if international agreements are
subject to contracting frictions. Suppose that trade volumes are affected by demand and/or
supply shocks, and a country observes the realization of these shocks before choosing its
domestic policies. Then a market-access-preservation rule would need to be state-contingent
in order to achieve effi ciency. But if state contingencies are not perfectly verifiable, so that the
international contract is incomplete, then a shallow integration approach will not be enough,
and imposing direct constraints on domestic policies is necessary to achieve effi ciency. A
similar point is made by Lee (2007) in a setting where governments can use domestic subsidies
to address a domestic externality, and the level of such externality is private information. In
related work, Horn et al (2010) show that a simple tariff agreement may be optimal when
trade volumes are small relative to contracting costs, while a deep agreement that imposes
direct constraints on domestic instruments becomes optimal as trade volumes increase, since
countries then have stronger incentives to use domestic instruments for protectionist purposes,
and hence the benefits of reining in these incentives exceed the associated contracting costs.
Second, an approach of ‘policed’shallow integration is not enough if the motives for trade
agreements go beyond the mere correction of terms-of-trade externalities. For example, a deep
integration approach is needed if there are domestic-commitment motives for international
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cooperation. This point is made by Brou and Ruta (2013) in a setting where governments
can choose trade policies and domestic subsidies.
As another example, Antras and Staiger (2012) show that deep integration is necessary in
an environment in which there is offshoring of intermediate inputs. Their key departure from
Bagwell and Staiger (2001) is that intermediate inputs are relationship-specific so that their
prices are set by ex-post bargaining and not in competitive markets. This implies that there
is an international hold-up problem in addition to the standard terms-of-trade externality so
that the ineffi ciency of the non-cooperative equilibrium is based on more than just market
access manipulation. As a result, the GATT’s shallow integration approach of exchanging and
securing market access concessions is no longer suffi cient to bring about an effi cient outcome.
Instead, direct constraints on domestic policy instruments are needed.
Grossman et al (forthcoming) similarly make the case for deep integration in the context of
a ‘new trade’model of regulatory cooperation. The key difference from Bagwell and Staiger
(2001) is that they build on Venables’ (1987) monopolistic competition model so that the
harmful international externality is a firm-delocation externality instead of a terms-of-trade
externality. They show that governments then have an incentive to use regulatory policy
for mercantilist objectives if their trade taxes are constrained by a trade agreement. They
also show that national treatment and mutual recognition are not enough to achieve global
effi ciency in their full model, and argue that it is hard to conceive of a workable version of non-
violation complaints. The bottomline is that a deep agreement involving explicit disciplines
on regulation is needed to implement an effi cient outcome.23
Recent work has also begun to scrutinize the provisions on investor protection included
in most modern trade agreements. For example, Ossa et al (2020) consider an environment
in which a host government wants to make a commitment towards foreign investors not to
expropriate them once they have sunk their investments. They ask whether it makes sense on
effi ciency grounds to allow foreign investors to directly sue host governments for comprehensive
money damages in arbitration tribunals outside the ordinary legal system, as is the case under
23The literature has also studied regulatory policy in oligopoly models emphasizing international profit-
shifting externalities; see Gandal and Shy (2001), Costinot (2008), Klimenko (2009), and Parenti and Van-
noorenberghe (2020). See also Battigalli and Maggi (2003) for an early analysis of international regulatory
agreements from an incomplete-contracting perspective.
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ISDS. They identify conditions under which ISDS is indeed optimal but also make clear that
the case for ISDS is far from absolute. For example, if the investment provisions primarily
address market access instead of commitment issues ISDS would not be optimal, as might
plausibly be the case in North-North agreements such as TTIP or CETA.24
The theoretical case for the particular formulation of the TRIPS agreement in the WTO
and related intellectual property rights provisions in PTAs is even weaker. The standard
reference in this context is Grossman and Lai (2004), who analyze non-cooperative and co-
operative patent policies in a simple model of expanding varieties. First, they show that
countries choose overly weak patent protection in the non-cooperative equilibrium since they
fail to internalize the effects of their patent policies on foreign profits. Second, they show that
international harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor suffi cient for global
effi ciency, thus casting doubt on the institutional design of TRIPS. And in addition to ques-
tionable effi ciency implications, harmonization may have strong redistributive effects in favor
of developed countries and at the expense of developing countries.25
Overall, the literature leaves us with two main messages. First, explicit disciplines on
domestic policies are needed in many realistic economic settings: the GATT’s approach of
‘policed’ shallow integration may not work in a world where international agreements are
subject to contracting frictions, where intermediate input trade is important, or where mar-
kets are imperfectly competitive. Second, many real-world attempts at deep integration are
probably suboptimal: the WTO’s subsidy agreement may be excessive, the WTO’s GATS
agreement may have the wrong focus, ISDS may not be optimal in some contexts, and the
TRIPS agreement may be misguided.
This takes us to our last point: the importance of quantitative evaluations of trade policy
institutions. The literature on the economics of deep integration has thus far remained largely
theoretical, with very few exceptions. One of these exceptions is Mei (2019), who builds on the
approach of Ossa (2014, 2016) to perform a quantitative analysis of regulatory protection and
cooperation using a model that shares many features with Grossman et al (forthcoming). He
24See Aisbett et al (2010a,b), Horn and Tangeras (2020), Janeba (2019), Kohler and Stahler (2019), Konrad
(2017), and Stahler (2018) for other work in this area.
25See Saggi (2016) for an excellent survey of the literature on the TRIPS agreement, and more generally on
trade and intellectual property rights, that has developed after Grossman and Lai (2004).
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interprets real-world standards as non-cooperative standards subject to national treatment
and uses this interpretation to calibrate his model parameters. He then asks what would
happen in the worst-case and best-case scenarios, i.e. the non-cooperative equilibrium without
national treatment and the fully cooperative equilibrium that would result from effi cient
negotiations. His results suggest that the WTO’s national treatment clause is not particularly
effective at curbing regulatory protectionism. Without national treatment, real incomes would
decline by 1.4 percent on average; with fully effi cient negotiations, real incomes would increase
by 12.6 percent on average. One of the limitations of Mei’s (2019) work is the use of coverage
ratios to measure product standards. Echoing our point above, to overcome this kind of
limitations it would be valuable to explore a partial equilibrium approach that pays close
attention to the specifics of a particular industry.
The approach of Ossa (2014, 2016) and Mei (2019) suggests a way forward for the quan-
titative evaluation of trade policy institutions. Real-world trade agreements are necessarily
incomplete contracts, since it is virtually impossible to negotiate over all policy instruments,
so the key question is not whether or not a particular trade policy institution is ineffi cient,
but how close it gets us to the effi ciency frontier and whether there are other simple institu-
tions that could outperform it quantitatively. In particular, one question that has not been
suffi ciently explored is, just how much could we potentially gain by moving from shallower
integration approaches —such as the ones that rely on national-treatment or market-access-
preservation rules —to deeper approaches that impose direct constraints on the governments’
domestic policy choices?
5 Conclusion
Deep integration is the future of trade policy and this future is fascinatingly complex. In this
paper, we have highlighted three dimensions of this complexity and introduced the literature
on each. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements is moving beyond the classic
antagonism between exporter interests who gain from trade and import-competing interests
who lose from trade. Second, producer lobbies and labor unions are no longer the only interest
groups mobilized by trade agreements, but other civic interest groups such as consumer rights
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or environmental protection advocates, and sometimes citizens at large, are now an active
part of the equation. And third, intuitions based on standard gains from trade are no longer
a good guide for assessing the merits of trade agreements, since modern agreements go far
beyond classic trade liberalization.
To us, this seems like a great opportunity as well as an important responsibility for trade
economists. It is a great opportunity, because it requires us to rethink much of our conven-
tional wisdom on trade policy and will thus be a source of interesting research questions for
years to come. But it is also an important responsibility, because the relevance of our field
will also depend on how much we have contributed to this crucial policy debate.
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